





How Should Autonomous Vehicles 
Redistribute the Risks of the Road?
Brian Berkey, PhD
There is a consensus among researchers who study autonomous vehicles that  
the introduction of these machines onto roadways could significantly reduce  
the number of injuries and deaths from vehicle accidents.1 
If this expectation materializes, there are strong rea-
sons to favor replacing human-driven vehicles with 
autonomous ones. The advent of autonomous vehicles, 
however, likely will be gradual, with the replacement 
of human-driven vehicles occurring over the course 
of many years.2  We can, therefore, reasonably predict 
that there will be a period of time in which autono-
mous vehicles share the road with human-driven 
vehicles—that is, a period that will be characterized by 
hybrid traffic.3  Consequently, companies that produce 
autonomous vehicles will have to make decisions about 
how to program those vehicles to behave in potential 
conflict situations involving human-driven vehicles.4  
These programming decisions will affect the lives 
and health of the public. Therefore, autonomous 
vehicle companies, elected officials, regulators, and 
independent experts must examine, through a trans-
parent process of open dialogue, the morally relevant 
dimensions of the machine learning mechanisms that 
direct the actions of autonomous vehicles operating in 
hybrid traffic situations.
In addition to the generally accepted aim of reduc-
ing traffic-related injuries and deaths as much as pos-
sible, a principle of fairness in the distribution of risk 
should inform our thinking about how companies that 
SUMMARY
• This Issue Brief considers the principles that should govern how 
companies that produce autonomous vehicles should program them 
to behave in potential conflict situations with vehicles controlled 
by human drivers.
• Research shows that consumers would prefer to purchase autono-
mous vehicles that are programmed to prioritize the safety of their 
occupants. But doing so means that in hybrid conditions, occupants 
of human-driven vehicles would systematically suffer more harms.
• This disparity should be of great concern, as it is likely that there 
will be a correlation between autonomous vehicle usage and wealth, 
since the large R&D costs that go into the making of autonomous 
vehicles will probably make them a luxury item, at least early on.
• The Issue Brief therefore proposes a Fair Risk Distribution principle 
to govern the programming of autonomous vehicles, and lays out 
the moral obligations of all manufacturers to not be the first to offer 
vehicles programmed to systematically prioritize the interests of 
their occupants.
• But can businesses that make autonomous vehicles be expected to 
uphold this moral obligation, and to resist the temptation to profit 
from the systematic prioritization of their occupants’ interests? 
Policymakers need to have an open discussion now as to whether 




produce autonomous vehicles ought to 
program them to respond in conflict 
situations involving human-driven 
vehicles.5  In this Issue Brief, I argue 
that this principle rules out program-
ming autonomous vehicles to system-
atically prioritize the interests of their 
occupants over those of the occupants 
of other vehicles, including human-
driven vehicles. 
Given that a recent academic 
study6 indicates that most consumers 
would prefer to purchase autonomous 
vehicles that do systematically priori-
tize the interests of occupants to those 
of others, my argument generates a 
substantial ethical restriction on com-
panies’ efforts to gain market share in 
the initial stages of the autonomous 
vehicle life cycle.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN 
HYBRID TRAFFIC
Circumstances undoubtedly will 
arise in which injuries and deaths on 
the road are unavoidable, even if, at 
some point in the future, all vehicles 
on the road are autonomous. At the 
very least, this will certainly be the 
case during the period of hybrid traf-
fic. In many of the circumstances in 
which accidents involving, or poten-
tially involving, both autonomous and 
human-driven vehicles are unavoid-
able, it is likely that the programming 
of the autonomous vehicles will play a 
significant role in determining exactly 
how the relevant accidents play out, 
and therefore who will suffer which 
resulting injuries and deaths. 
There are several ways in which 
the interests of occupants of autono-
mous vehicles might come into con-
flict with the interests of occupants of 
human-driven vehicles, particularly in 
situations that have the rough struc-
ture of “trolley” cases.7  Consider the 
following case:8
The driver of a standard (i.e., non-
autonomous) bus traveling on a narrow 
and lightly traveled two-lane cliffside 
road swerves from the cliffside lane 
into the inner lane in order to avoid 
an animal in the road. An autonomous 
car traveling in the inner lane comes 
around a sharp curve and recognizes 
that the bus is in its lane just ahead. 
Based on data on the behavior of human 
drivers that is available to the autono-
mous system, it estimates that if the 
autonomous car continues in its lane, it 
is virtually certain that the bus driver 
will attempt to swerve back into cliffside 
lane; and assuming that the bus driver 
does attempt to swerve back, there is an 
approximately 90% probability that he 
will lose control of the bus, and the bus 
will go over the cliff, killing the driver 
and all 30 passengers. The autonomous 
car’s only other option is to drive into 
the cliff wall, which would carry an 
approximately 10% risk of death for the 
vehicle’s single occupant, and, conditional 
on survival, a 50% risk of serious injury. 
If the autonomous vehicle does this, there 
is an approximately 99% probability that 
the bus will continue on safely and avoid 
any injuries or deaths. 
In order to recognize the distinc-
tive risk distribution issues raised by 
the prospect of hybrid traffic sce-
narios, it is important to note that 
if the bus were also autonomous, its 
occupants could be subject to signifi-
cantly lower risks of injury and death, 
while the occupant of the autonomous 
vehicle could be at greater risk. For 
example, the bus’s system could rec-
ognize that its occupants’ safety would 
be best protected by moving back into 
the cliffside lane more slowly than a 
human driver would likely attempt 
to move. This would, we can imagine, 
result in a collision with the autono-
mous car, thus guaranteeing that its 
occupant is at least seriously injured, 
if not killed; but it would also ensure 
that the bus’s occupants suffer at most 
  1 For a sampling of this research, see the Introduction of my 
paper, “Autonomous Vehicles, Business Ethics, and Risk 
Distribution in Hybrid Traffic,” upon which this Issue Brief is 
based.
  2 van Loon, R.J. & Martens, M.H. (2015). “Automated 
Driving and its Effects on the Safety Ecosystem: How Do 
Compatibility Issues Affect the Transition Period?” Procedia 
Manufacturing 3:3280-85.
  3 Goodall, N.J. (2014). “Ethical Decision Making During Au-
tomated Vehicle Crashes.” Transportation Research Record 
2424, p. 59; and Hübner, D. & White, L. (2018). “Crash 
Algorithms for Autonomous Cars: How the Trolley Problem 
Can Move Us Beyond Harm Minimization.” Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 21, p. 686.
  4 These decisions almost certainly will not take the form of 
discrete choices—that is, companies will not be program-
ming autonomous vehicles for circumstances with highly 
specific sets of features. This is because autonomous 
vehicles are being designed such that machine learning 
mechanisms will determine how they will come to behave 
in new types of conflict situations (as well as more gener-
ally). This complicates how we must think about the ethics 
of the relevant programming decisions somewhat, although 
not fundamentally. Whatever values would rightly guide 
the direct programming of autonomous vehicles ought, as 
much as possible, to guide the programming of the relevant 
machine learning mechanisms, as well. I am grateful to 
John Basl and Jeff Behrends for a helpful discussion of this 
issue. 
  5 This principle is also relevant to programming choices 
involving other kinds of conflicts, for example those with 
pedestrians or cyclists, although its implications regard-




very minor injuries. 
This case is complex, but the gen-
eral point it helps to highlight is fairly 
clear and, on reflection, should not 
be surprising. Because autonomous 
vehicle systems will have access to 
massive amounts of data that human 
drivers cannot employ in their neces-
sarily split-second decision-making in 
conflict situations on the road—and 
since they will be capable also of using 
that data to determine what they will 
do—autonomous vehicles could, in 
principle, be programmed in ways 
that would ensure that occupants of 
human-driven vehicles are system-
atically subject to greater risks of 
injury and death on the road than are 
occupants of autonomous vehicles. 
The autonomous car in the above case, 
for example, could be programmed in 
a way that would make it very likely 
that the bus will go over the cliff and 
kill all of the people onboard, despite 
the fact that it instead could have 
been programmed in a way that would 
ensure that its occupant is subjected 
to more risk when necessary in order 
to prevent a greater number of people 
in the human-driven bus from being 
subject to more extensive and more 
serious risks. 
If autonomous vehicles are pro-
grammed in ways that systematically 
prioritize protecting their occupants 
from risks and harms as much as 
possible, then the result, in hybrid 
traffic conditions, will be that occu-
pants of human-driven vehicles will 
systematically suffer more harms, and 
more serious harms, than occupants of 
autonomous vehicles in circumstances 
in which an accident is unavoidable. 
And this is the case not only for those 
in human-driven vehicles, but also for 
pedestrians, cyclists, and road workers.
This should concern us a great 
deal, since it seems very likely that, at 
least for a significant period of time, 
there will be a correlation between 
wealth and autonomous vehicle own-
ership and use. Like other new and 
heavily anticipated products for which 
development requires large R&D 
costs, autonomous vehicles seem likely 
to be a luxury item, at least initially, 
available primarily to wealthier people. 
If this occurs, then less well-off indi-
viduals, who will mostly continue to 
drive standard vehicles, will systemati-
cally be at greater risk of injury and 
death on the road. These differences 
in risk exposure could be much less 
substantial if autonomous vehicles 
are programmed in ways that refrain 
from prioritizing the interests of their 
occupants so heavily. 
In the face of such a conflict, it is 
important for there to be a principle 
(or principles) guiding the program-
ming of autonomous vehicles. 
significantly.
  6 Bonnefon, J.F., Shariff, A., & Rahwan, I. (2016). “The Social 
Dilemma of Autonomous Vehicles.” Science 352: 1573-76.
  7 There has been a fair bit of debate about the usefulness 
of trolley-style cases for thinking about some of the ethical 
issues raised by the development and introduction onto the 
road of autonomous vehicles. In my view, it can sometimes 
be useful to consider what ought to be done in cases in 
which certainty about the outcomes of different actions is 
assumed (as in traditional trolley cases) before reflecting 
on what ought to be done in cases that are similar in many 
respects but also involve risk and/or uncertainty. Further-
more, it is not difficult to design trolley-style cases in a way 
that includes the dimensions of risk and/or uncertainty that 
will generally characterize cases involving autonomous 
vehicles. 
  8 This case is based loosely on a case given by Patrick 
Lin (2015). “Why Ethics Matters for Autonomous Cars.” 
In Maurer et al. (eds.), Autonomous Fahren: Technische, 
Rechtliche und Gesellschaftliche Aspekte. Berlin: Springer, 
pp. 76-77).
 9  As matter of public policy, it is worth considering whether 
there might be obligations applying to, for example, gov-
ernments, vehicle manufacturers, and even individuals, 
to promote equality in access to autonomous vehicles so 
that the inequalities in the road risks to which individuals 
are subjected are at least more limited than they would 
otherwise be.
10 Consumers tend to believe both that they are entitled to be 
concerned about their own safety when they are purchas-
ing products and that companies are doing something 
good when they make their products safer for consumers. 
In most cases this is clearly correct, since most products 
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As an ethical matter, the pro-
gramming of autonomous vehicles 
for circumstances involving hybrid 
traffic ought to be guided, as much as 
possible, by a principle of fairness in 
the distribution of the unavoidable 
risks of the road. This principle would 
capture the importance of avoiding an 
outcome in which wealthier members 
of society disproportionately enjoy the 
benefits of increased safety generated 
by autonomous vehicles, while the 
less well off—as well as pedestrians, 
cyclists, and road workers—dispropor-
tionately bear the risks of the road.
What would a fair distribution of 
the risks of the road look like? A rea-
sonable starting point is to think that 
these risks should be distributed as 
evenly as possible, consistent with the 
aim of minimizing the total amount 
of harm that will be caused by traffic-
related accidents.
Taking this as a starting point, we 
can then ask when it is either permis-
sible or required for companies pro-
ducing autonomous vehicles to deviate 
from aiming at an equal distribution 
of the risks. Here, then, is an initial 
formulation of a plausible Fair Risk 
Distribution principle: 
Autonomous vehicles ought to be 
programmed so that, to the greatest 
extent possible consistent with the aim of 
minimizing traffic-related injuries and 
deaths, the risks of the road are distrib-
uted equally among all of those who 
might be harmed as a result of the use of 
motor vehicles, unless there is a morally 
compelling reason for deviating from this 
aim.
Determining what may count as a 
morally compelling reason to deviate 
from aiming at an equal distribution 
of the risks of the road would require 
dialogue among companies, relevant 
regulators, and elected officials. Two 
arguments for deviation come to mind 
immediately:
1. SPECIAL PROTECTIONS FOR 
PEDESTRIANS AND CYCLISTS?
It may be the case that a poten-
tially significant deviation from an 
equal distribution of risks between, on 
the one hand, occupants of vehicles, 
and on the other, pedestrians and 
cyclists, might be required. It seems 
reasonable that those who choose to 
introduce risks like serious injury or 
death on and near roadways in order 
to enjoy the benefits of the activities 
(driving) that unavoidably involve 
these risks, should, where possible, 
at least bear a greater share of the 
risks than those (pedestrians and 
cyclists) who are not engaged in the 
activities that impose them. If this is 
correct, then it may be impermissible 
for autonomous vehicles to be pro-
grammed in ways that will lead them 
to, for example, swerve into a single 
pedestrian when this would risk caus-
ing her significant harm, even when 
this is the only way to protect multiple 
are such that making them safer for their consumers does 
not make them more dangerous for others. Vehicles at 
least can be an exception to this belief, however, since, for 
example, for occupants of typical car, a crash with a large 
SUV will, on average, cause more harm than a crash with 
another typical car. Many people’s view about the ethics of 
producing large SUVs might change at least somewhat if 
they were to attend more clearly to this fact.
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occupants from the risk of very serious 
harms. 
2. SPECIAL BENEFITS FOR 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE USERS?
Another argument begins by not-
ing that autonomous vehicles will be 
significantly safer than human-driven 
vehicles. Because of this, anyone who 
transitions from driving a standard 
vehicle to using an autonomous 
vehicle will reduce the total amount 
of risk to which road users are subject. 
It might be claimed that their role in 
reducing the overall risks of the road 
entitles autonomous vehicle users to 
a greater share of the benefits of that 
risk reduction than those who con-
tinue to drive standard vehicles. This 
argument for deviating from an equal 
distribution of risk should be rejected.
This argument would be compel-
ling if everyone had at least roughly 
equal access to use of the safer 
alternative, and so could equally avoid 
imposing greater overall risks on 
road users. In a world, for example, 
in which purchasing and/or using an 
autonomous vehicle were no more 
expensive than purchasing and/or 
using a standard vehicle, users of 
autonomous vehicles would have a 
legitimate claim to have their vehicles 
programmed in ways that, at least to 
some extent, prioritize their safety 
over that of occupants of human-
driven vehicles. However, when access 
to the safer alternative of autonomous 
vehicles is strongly correlated with 
wealth, it is not legitimate for those 
who are fortunate enough to have 
access to those vehicles to insist that 
they also benefit significantly more 
from the reduction in the overall risks 
of the road than those who simply 
cannot afford to switch to using them. 
We should conclude that, in 
the programming of autonomous 
vehicles, there is no clear justifica-
tion for deviating from aiming at an 
equal distribution of the risks of the 
road between users of autonomous 
vehicles and users of standard vehicles 
in conditions of hybrid traffic.9  We 
should not simply accept that it is 
permissible for companies to facilitate 
the wealthy in distributing these risks 
away from themselves and onto those 
who cannot afford the more expensive, 
safer products that they can produce. 
Relative safety on the road should not 
be, in effect, for sale on the market.10  
There are, however, limitations of 
the principle’s applicability to business 
decisions involving the programming 
of autonomous vehicles.
THE LIMITS OF FAIR RISK 
DISTRIBUTION
If my argument to this point is 
correct, then companies have strong 
moral reasons to aim at as equal a 
distribution of the risks of the road 
among vehicle users as possible in the 
programming of their autonomous 
vehicles. The most important impli-
cation is that every company has an 
obligation not to be the first to offer 
autonomous vehicles programmed in 
a way that is inconsistent with a fair 
distribution of risk and, in particular, 
obligated not to be the first to offer 
vehicles programmed to systematically 
prioritize the interests of occupants. 
If even one company does this, 
however, it would appear that, given 
reasonable predictions about con-
sumer behavior, other companies 
cannot be obligated to refrain from 
following suit. This constitutes a kind 
of collective action problem. The busi-
ness case for making a moral decision 
that runs counter to the Fair Risk 
Distribution principle is simply that 
the potential economic gains available 
are too great, especially for a company 
that has the opportunity to be the first 
to market. But companies producing 
autonomous vehicles must resist this 
temptation to profit from the system-
atic prioritization of their occupants’ 
interests. Doing so would constitute 
a very serious moral violation, and it 
would virtually ensure a quite dis-
proportionate and unfair distribution 
of the safety benefits of autonomous 
vehicles. 
Other collective action problems 
are typically resolved through legisla-
tion and/or regulation. Whether or 
not either policy approach is appro-
priate in this instance, there should, 
at the very least, be an open dialogue 
about the concerns discussed in this 
Issue Brief between autonomous 
vehicle producers and federal policy-
makers while a desirable outcome—in 
terms of public health and fairness—is 
still achievable. 
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